According to Neocleous “the concept ‘nature’ is, of course, deeply problematical” and “an empty vessel to be filled with whatever meaning is politically expedient”. The context for this is not nature “within fascism” but necessarily in itself. That is to say, Neocleous doesn’t see nature as a concept that can be negotiated, but that holds within it an already reactionary character. It seems the main mistake that fascism makes in regard to nature is to think of it as a subject in itself. For Neocleous nature is culturally constructed and thus a kind of artifice attached to human subjectivity. This goes so far as to cause Neocleous to take a negative view towards political ecology and one can almost say he sees being anti-ecological as being on par with an anti-fascist position. He claims that green groups and philosophies, like Deep Ecology (with which I too have issues, though in a different register), make the same mistake concerning nature (that it is a subject in itself) and even aside from that totalitarian political structures would be necessary to carry out the environmental changes necessary.
It is strange, even uncanny, to note how agreeable Nazi and Italian fascist rhetoric is with current ‘green politics’. The projects undertaken within the individual nations, while certainly not being able to stand up to current environmental demands, were far more attentive to creating cultural artifice (i.e. roads) that worked ascetically with the natural environment than even current standards. Of course it would be pure farce for neo-fascist groups, like the American Nazi Green party, to claim a true historical backing for green politics as the war machine fostered within historical fascism and rapid industrialization were environmentally destructive on a massive scale. Yet, Neocleous takes this rhetoric and, oddly, believes it. He seems to believe that fascism has some kind of material concern for nature other than the way it can be used to give weight to the myth of the nation. This trust in the rhetoric completely contradicts his emphasis on ‘positive analysis’ and ‘history’. (Full disclosure – the Latin nasci – to be born – is the root of both nation and nature. Still, I don’t see Neocleous claiming that birth is a necessarily fascist concept. This plays an important role in Lawlor’s book as well, though in a very different direction.)
A new philosophy of nature, especially a vitalist one, must begin by acknowledging that everything is natural. Everything that exists, be it organic and inorganic, is by definition natural. This implies a political and ecological ontology arising out of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Deleuze tells us that Spinoza begins with God to be done with God as quickly as possible. Since the Spinozist equivocation is ‘God or Nature’ one may also say that Spinoza begins with nature to move past it. Not that Deleuze’s reading is completely correct here, as if Spinoza’s Ethics was not pious to God or Nature, rather what Spinoza does is avoid theological quibbling. He gives God or Nature the simplest definition and moves from that truth inward. One of the most obvious implications of this thesis is that, if whatever happens is God’s will (or an outworking from some law of nature), then there is no good or evil from that higher perspective. Since God is perfect we are left in the position of Job crying violence but being made to answer who we are in the face of that impersonal power. A political ecology beginning with this insight may move past the fascist determination of nature. Rather than naming oppressive structures as natural, which fascism did with regard to women and childbirth, a Spinozist pan-naturalism names all the so called deviant behaviours natural as well. Artifice and nature are not mutually exclusive and indeed we have neither without the other, naming a kind of cultural dialectic imposed upon a univocal substance.
Of course, this answers very little, only begins to move toward a non-fascist ontology of nature. From there we must modify St. Paul and say that “Everything is natural, but not everything is beneficial.” In Spinozist terms this ontology is only the beginning of a non-fascist ethics. From here it seems helpful to look again at Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus as both a handbook for non-fascist living and a lengthy prolegomena to any new philosophy of nature or philosophy of life – both together: a new vitalist philosophy.

Saturday, January 27, 2007 at 9:35 pm
Absolutely right, i think, about beginning with a refusal of the natural/unnatural (or deviant) distinction.
Furthermore, i think that the definition of the nature/god-One as not a one, or a many, but as multiplicity, is important — that is, the pluralistic impulse is key. Taking Mussolini’s case, for example, the entire project — as many of my older family members tell the tale — was premised on the elimination of whatever did not fit the identitarian concept of “Italy,” such as dialects, “premodern” habits, etc, etc.
Sunday, January 28, 2007 at 5:22 am
Is the word “natural” a predicate added to the merely existent (“everything that is, is natural”)? If it is, what does it predicate?
Compare “everything that is, is of a common (natural) substance with everything else that is”, or, “everything that is, is in the relation (of co-naturality) with everything else that is: there is no absolute non-relation between any two existents”.
In other words, does the naturalness of nature refer to anything other than its univocity – is there anything to distinguish being-in-nature from being in general? Is nature simply another name for that which is said in the same way of everything of which it is said?
Sunday, January 28, 2007 at 5:42 am
Dominic,
Great questions.
It seems to me that ‘nature’ is the name of kind of whole-being (which is of course not one). So ‘natural’ would refer to the second definition you give, especially the bit about there is no absolute non-relation (though there are of course contingent non-relations due to distance and other material issues). I’m not really sure that there is any way of distinguishing being-in-nature from being in general. I think this is partly what was at issue between Badiou and Deleuze in their argument, though we only have Badiou’s word for Deleuze’s responses. For Deleuze we can only think being on the basis of singular beings, while Badiou formalizes being even within beings. (Does that seem right? You know Badiou better than I do.)
That said, I’m still thinking through this, what is presented here are kind of working notes. So I really appreciate these questions.
Discard,
I think that really is at issue here. The notion that really disgusts me in Neocleous and other contemporary ‘Enlightenment rationalists’ is this idea that we can create a rational society using the tools of positive science. It seems so obvious to me that this is a complete myth, like the myth of the nation, and so Neocleaous and people like him have to differentiate between good and bad myths but have no way of doing so. Their rejection of forces and other vitalist concepts seems to me to be the reason for this. So, paradoxically, they are repeating this kind of political static ONE (to be oppossed to a kind of virtual one within multiplicity). Marxist movements also got rid of the local with disastrous results and this is one reason why I think Zapatismo is an improvement and growth out of Maoism (with an obvious ‘other Mexican’ heritage). It’s interesting to note, and I will try and write about this later, that the Zapatista’s have a coherent political ecology tied to local religious practices within their political ideology. One could hardly call them fascists, whatever mistakes they have made (and their honesty about mistakes and shortcomings is another sign that this is not in any way fascist, not even a kind of ‘everyday fascism’).
Monday, January 29, 2007 at 6:08 pm
How would you feel about Latour’s claim that political ecology has never had anything to do with nature? That rather than saying everything is nature, one should say “nothing is nature”.
Monday, January 29, 2007 at 6:49 pm
I’m not real familiar with his work, though I will be looking at it in relation to this later. I have done a bit with Serres, who I actually prefer to Latour at this stage, and this seems to be one of those moments. I don’t know though. “Nothing is nature.” Well, if there was nothing it would be nature, seems alright to say I suppose, I just don’t know what the content of that statement really is.
As to the political ecology bit, seems to me that he has a real point depending on what he means by nature. Nature as a reified object or subject isn’t what political ecology should concern itself with, but nature as a political site is. Does that make sense?
But, really, this is all speculative on my part as I’m not real familiar with his work. Would you suggest something?
Tuesday, January 30, 2007 at 8:04 am
I think you’re spot on re: nature as a political site.
For Latour, nature (again) is a culturally constructed concept that is not held outside of the West. For political ecology to perform the work of forming a global collective through democracy, we have to give up the notion of nature as separate to society, as claims to natural laws have only been used to silence politics (e.g. the common invocation of Malthusian limits).
Latour’s “Politics of Nature” seems like a good starting point as any. A summary has been provided on his website – http://www.bruno-latour.fr/livres/ix_chap5.html
Also interesting, is the equation of conservation work with neocolonialism, particularly in Africa which Roderick Neumann’s Imposing Wilderness explores in detail.
Sunday, February 4, 2007 at 2:22 pm
Anthony, I think you are right about Neocleous – his work isn’t particularly convincing. His Administering Civil Society is better than his work on fascism, but even that work is compromised by a rather vulgar class instrumentalism and a resultant instrumentalist theory of the state. His work on fascism is particularly uncompelling and its major weakness is his unwillingness to actually engage with the theorists he is discussing: in one article (which I believe was incorporated in the Fascism book), he makes the widely incorrect claim that Foucault is an inverted version of Schmitt on the basis of the extract from ‘Society Must be Defended’ that was published in Power/Knowledge as “Two Lectures.” It’s an absolutely untenable claim. Regarding the “nature” claim he makes, he seems unwilling to recognize how all politics require a “natural” – human rights, in liberal political theory, are as “naturalized” as “blood and soil” in fascism.
Tuesday, February 20, 2007 at 6:01 pm
[...] Anthony Paul Smith explains: According to Neocleous “the concept ‘nature’ is, of course, deeply problematical” and “an empty vessel to be filled with whatever meaning is politically expedient”. The context for this is not nature “within fascism” but necessarily in itself. That is to say, Neocleous doesn’t see nature as a concept that can be negotiated, but that holds within it an already reactionary character. It seems the main mistake that fascism makes in regard to nature is to think of it as a subject in itself. For Neocleous nature is culturally constructed and thus a kind of artifice attached to human subjectivity. This goes so far as to cause Neocleous to take a negative view towards political ecology and one can almost say he sees being anti-ecological as being on par with an anti-fascist position. He claims that green groups and philosophies, like Deep Ecology (with which I too have issues, though in a different register), make the same mistake concerning nature (that it is a subject in itself) and even aside from that totalitarian political structures would be necessary to carry out the environmental changes necessary. [...]