In discussing the division between analytic and continental philosophy, one should never forget the issues of institutional power that are at play — such as Brian Leiter’s consistent claim that the “best” continental schools are those where it is pursued within an analytic framework while those that are more identified with the continental tradition are ignored. Yet on the day-to-day level of intellectual practice, it seems to me that the divide would be less of a big deal if we could replace this:
- Oh my God, I can’t believe you don’t know this figure/body of work that renders your entire project redunant! The analytic/continental blinders strike again!
with this:
- That’s an interesting project — have you looked at X? Here’s a specific piece of writing that doesn’t require a lot of technical background that can help you discern whether X is relevant to what you’re trying to work through.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 10:00 am
This post rests on the idea that continental and analytic philosophers are talking to each other. In my experience, that just doesn’t happen too often. At least at the research university level, those camps have managed to create all sorts of walls from really ever having to deal with each other.
When I have had random conversations with analytic philosophers in person, the conversations have always been pleasant and useful. But usually we are talking about conversations with people within 5 to 8 years of myself, and among younger philosophers the divisions seem less important. The only time I have non-random conversations with analytic philosophers in person are when I am talking to analytic animal ethicists. Those conversations are either highly productive, or the problems isn’t one of being accused of redundancy.
I’m sure if I did more with, say, metaphysics, it would be a different story.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 10:00 am
Adam,
All good points, especially the institutional power issue that Leiter and others constantly ignore. It is also true in the pragmatism vs. analytic division, although our differences are much less a raucous debate.
I doubly concur on the latter point. I often hear that I should read X in analytic, but much of the time when I look them up, I discover that while the topic is relevant, the background assumptions and methodology are so far apart as to require writing a book’s worth of additional analysis to make use of the insights. It is almost never worth the effort, but puts minority tradition scholars like myself in a bind as we are required by the powers-that-be to play catchup to play the Big Game at all. Must those of a non-dominant tradition, i.e., not analytic, always measure themselves up in order to publish in “mainstream” journals?
It is then that I so greatly appreciate those who “specialize” in being “bridge scholars,” such as Mark Johnson on (neoclassical) pragmatism and neurophilosophy, etc. That said, bridge scholars do not always have the reputation necessary in both sides to be an effective bridge.
As for “the project is redundant,” much of the time that is not the case due to the difference in background, etc. But you are right the claim gets made.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 10:06 am
p.s. I would call it an “analytic vs. everyone else divide,” as I hear the constant struggle also coming from other non-mainstream philosophies, e.g., African/African diaspora, Asian in its varieties, etc.
Scu,
If you work in metaphysics, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind as I do, it’s almost never productive. That said, as much as I disagree with everything he says, I admit that Chalmers is fun to read….
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 10:08 am
Jason, I would characterize Leiter’s role more as “enforcing” rather than “ignoring” the institutional power issues.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 10:11 am
Scu, If such exchanges never or rarely took place, where would I have come up with the idea for this post?
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 11:14 am
Adam,
I was talking about my own particular world, and most of those whose works I interact with in person. As I said at the end, if I was doing something with metaphysics, I am sure that this would be a different story. Or plenty of other fields. The problem that analytic, and as Jason rightly points out, all other types of philosophy has is a different conversation in, say, ethics.
I really can only imagine if the above conversation takes place over and over again how annoying that is.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 11:34 am
Sorry for any perceived throat-jumping-down.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 12:01 pm
If you work in metaphysics, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind as I do, it’s almost never productive.
I find this hard to believe! Well, easy to believe about phenomenology, and pretty plausible about metaphysics, since the number of things prosecuted under the name “metaphysics” is bewildering and many things with that label in analytic philosophy seem to me to be rather less than worthwhile. (But I like some of Mark Johnston’s stuff, and Huw Price.) But phil mind? That’s pretty diverse, and I would think that someone like Finkelstein or Moran would be worth checking out. (I mean I don’t know what in particular you do, so maybe not.)
Granted, the odds that Joe Random Analytic Philosopher of Mind X you might wind up talking to will have a Finkelstein-ish outlook are pretty damn slim.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 at 7:04 pm
I agree, Adam. I find one of the benefits of looking at a diversity of approaches is that sometimes I notice somebody doing something in another tradition, and in the course of trying to puzzle out why they are doing it, I realize that some people in my own tradition that had previously confused me (or seemed utterly misguided to me) were basically trying to do the same thing (which doesn’t always make them seem less misguided, but it sometimes has that effect). Familiarity can make some things harder to see, so it can be valuable to see them in unfamiliar forms.
Wednesday, September 21, 2011 at 3:26 pm
Adam,
You’re right; I wrote it improperly. I meant to say that there are enforcers, e.g., Leiter, and the rest ignore the enforcement when it happens (enablers).
Ben,
I work in process metaphysics, hence lack of discourse should be no surprise. Same with phenomenology–especially its non-Husserlian variants. But as for analytic philosophy of mind, you mentioned Johnson and Price. Johnson is not an analytic–he’s a bridge thinker working outside those labels and I am versed in his work. We even had similar inspirations as I graduated from where he once taught and worked with Thomas Alexander, who appears in most of his prefaces. As for Huw Price, who I know about because I applied to the pragmatist philosophy of mind arc grant as it’s in my specialty, much of what I saw had such a different background as not to be helpful.
Honestly, I think there is a LOT LESS innovative philosophy out there than people give credit, in part due to institutional structures, etc. Moreover, a lot of ideas get duplicated across many fields, and for the most part I see duplication, but in such a way that it would be hasty to reduce one to the other.
I will gladly accept more references to check out, especially in analytic. I am still catching up on McDowell, more Davidson, etc.
Protagoras,
I take that as an argument for pluralism and doing history.
Wednesday, September 21, 2011 at 6:11 pm
I mentioned Johnston. He is (also?) interested in process metaphysics, but he’s certainly analytic by training if nothing else—did his dissertation under Kripke. (And look at who he’s engaging with in (this draft of a chapter of) The Manifest, which I hope appears in a for-real form at some point because I want to read it.)
Wednesday, September 21, 2011 at 10:45 pm
I do not see anything in there that piques my interests or explains why you posted it. I did not read it carefully–perhaps you can tell me what I’m missing?
Let me explain where I’m coming from. I work in the technical mechanics of my field such that I can *never* wholesale borrow from another discipline without extreme amounts of explanation. Especially because so many basic theses are incompatible. I note that many contemporary philosophers cobble things together like syncretists within their tradition. That just will not do for systematic philosophy. I am claiming that those in a similar position are likewise limited in appropriating from everywhere, which is a limitation that the average thinker does not feel. If I did, then I’d be yet another philosopher riffing off someone else, another creative reading, which I am expressedly not trying to do. It’s a minority position, I know, and terribly unfashionable. You may call me Mr. Curmudgeon, m’lord.
Thursday, September 22, 2011 at 2:25 pm
The explanation for my having posted it is that it is manifestly engaged with analytic philosophy, thus confirming (for me) that we are thinking of different people, not just different spellings. I barely skimmed it! I have a vague understanding of the general thesis (mostly derived from his mentions of it in Saving God) which makes me interested in seeing the argument more; it promises to have some interesting things to say about the boring old realist/anti-realist debates in metaphysics. I’m hardly prepared to make recommendations specific to you, since all I know about you is that you like process metaphysics (and now, that you’re a systematist and above-average thinker).
Thursday, September 22, 2011 at 5:50 pm
Ben,
By “average,” I meant, not arguing common theses or in common ways.
We are thinking of different people as it was a mistake on my part. Read Mark Johnson, who critiques much of the whole enterprise of analytic philosophy of mind from within. I can recommend a specific book if you have the interest. As for the theses, I didn’t see anything in particular that was informative, because as usual the premises are so contrary that there’s not much to work with. Hence, traditional divides cannot always be easily overcome. That said, I’ve spent more than a little time reading Buddhism, since that is far more helpful than much analytic philosophy. The background premises are more mutually coherent. Most anything working through taxonomy or logical problems, e.g., Broad’s classic Mind and World, can transcend any particular tradition because it makes its premises so explicit.
As for “realist,” it often depends on what you mean by “realist,” and I suspect my pragmatic definition would not jibe with many analytic ones; e.g., it’s not about object-independence, but the reality of universals, perceptual phenomena, etc. that scientific naturalist bents won’t accept.