In my previous post, I mentioned the ways that liberal Christians often seem to be attempting to superficially “hijack” Christianity for liberal ends. By this I didn’t mean to say that Christianity is necessarily incompatible wtih such ends, only to point out the inadequacy of their methods. For instance, when liberals try to reach out to “persuadable” evangalicals, they will often point out the wealth of evidence that concern for the poor or environmental conservation are “biblical” values — and I should say that the liberal advocate here is completely, 100% factually right. I agree with them completely, and indeed I think it’s indisputable for anyone who takes an objective look at the Bible. And yet these arguments basically don’t work. Why?
One could point out the fact that evangelicals don’t “really” take the Bible literally, but that just repeats the problem: it’s a superficial, “gotcha” type of argument that doesn’t engage with the issue at the appropriate level. People don’t generally change their minds when you catch them in a surface-level contradiction — they either shrug it off or get mad. In fact, I’m going to risk a bold hypothesis: reasoned argument never produces a change in basic worldview or practice.
This is not to say that reasoned argument is useless. It’s a valuable intellectual skill, but one that only really holds within the boundaries of certain intellectual games. The basic error of liberal proceduralism is that it assumes all of life can be made into one of those intellectual games — that politics and religion, which touch on the most intimate and important matters in our shared life, should conduct themselves in basically the same way as a debate about how you can tell if someone is a philosophical zombie or how to explain the behavior of quantum particles.

Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 10:25 am
I have come to the same conclusion while having online forum discussions: if there is no common ground, all parties can effectively blame others for fallacies until everyone just agree to disagree. The existence of culture wars is part of this phenomenon.
I think this has to do how we understand argument; as long as we see it as as a pure and atomistic “thing” of the social reality, we fail to see that it actually emerges from the deeper values and thoughts of the individual consciousnesses. Understanding this invisible structure makes it much easier to observe the discourse system and enable reflective attitude.
Lately I have been reading William Isaacs’ Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together, which I think pretty much explains why communicative action never takes place. Here is one view on the book: http://www.rethinkingcomplexity.com/posts/10-24-11/reflections-dialogue-power-shared-meaning
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 11:41 am
I will say that the liberal argument makes the assumption that people arrive at positions in intellectually “honest” ways. Hence, all we have to do is dissuade someone from his or her rational belief. This obviously doesn’t work, and it also highlights why non-psychoanalytic therapies often fail. You have to account for the various defenses and resistance (often unconscious) that prevent people from changing. Without taking defenses into consideration, the possibility of change is next to none.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 1:12 pm
Peter Singer often recounts that the first chapter of “Animal Liberation” didn’t convince (“convert”?) anyone–it’s the chapter on factory farming. This is why anti-choicers like showing pictures of dead fetuses and why the American government doesn’t allow corpses of American soldiers to be filmed. I’m sure there is much “moral psychology” written on the blatantly apparently fact that is nonetheless always denied that arguments don’t convince; they retroactively justify.
There also seems to be quite a bit of evidence that proof to the contrary of X more often than not only reinforces belief in X–i.e., there is something about the human brain or mind that makes us resist evidence. And, perversely, this seems to be strengthened–not weakened–among people with advanced educations; i.e., professional or graduate degrees. Likely because we are all narcissists and refuse to recognize the possibility that we might be wrong.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 2:43 pm
I sometimes wonder if it was because I did not have the ‘structural stability’ of an institution to process some of the challenges to my thought most recently that facilitated significant change. Though maybe now I am simply tossed about by every gust of hot air.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 4:07 pm
Aristotle was waaaaaay ahead of you, Adam.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 7:25 pm
Reasoned arguments moved me from fundamentalist Christianity to agnostic Christianity, convinced me that evolution was true, and convinced me that homosexuality was natural and not a “sin”. However, it took a long time, and I am something of a truth-seeker.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 8:41 pm
“Peter Singer often recounts that the first chapter of “Animal Liberation” didn’t convince (“convert”?) anyone–it’s the chapter on factory farming.”
Can you give me a source for this? I remember Brian Leiter posted a while back about how he couldn’t find Singer actually saying this anywhere.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 8:55 pm
“Reasoned arguments moved me from fundamentalist Christianity to agnostic Christianity, convinced me that evolution was true, and convinced me that homosexuality was natural and not a “sin”. However, it took a long time, and I am something of a truth-seeker.”
You have to already be (somehow) positioned as receptive to the reasoned argument. If you are, then the reasoned argument may indeed move you away from a previously held belief.
Sunday, January 29, 2012 at 10:20 pm
As I’ve argued, the solution is more dogmatism. If you’re going to be a dick . . . be a dick. Arguing is just a kind of praxeological porn.
Monday, January 30, 2012 at 6:21 am
I can’t imagine anyone being moved from a “pro-life” to a “pro-choice” position by rational argument, or in the other direction. But that’s because I think that the “pro-life” position is (in most cases) irrationally anchored, while the “pro-choice” one is abundantly rationally justified: a person attached to an irrational position will not become detached from it by rational processes, and a person attached to a rational position will only switch to an irrational one for irrational reasons.
Now, you could argue that both positions are in fact irrationally anchored: perhaps most people who are “pro-choice” are so because of a visceral horror at the thought of forced pregnancy, backstreet abortions and so on, and talk about women’s rights, personhood, physical self-ownership and so on is just a way of keeping tabs, in the lingua franca of (a particular genre of) public argument, on the ramifications of this visceral commitment.
Some people I think would be happy with this – with the idea that what makes them right and their opponents wrong is that they have the *right* emotional reactions, while the other guys have the *wrong* ones. On this view, pro-lifers are emotionally misconfigured – they *care* about the wrong things. Rational arguments are ineffective because they don’t, by and large, affect what people care about; for that, you need forms of persuasion which are capable of unsticking a person from one position and gluing them onto another. At best, rational argument can act as a solvent, weakening the adhesive strength of such attachments, creating the opportunity for some countervailing narrative to do its work. In fact, the solvent properties of rationality make it as unwelcome amongst the “good” guys as amongst the “bad” guys, since it’s as apt to dissolve the “right” emotional concrescences as the “wrong” ones.
So one of the things one might mean by saying that one is a “rationalist” is that one believes that the rightness or wrongness of a position does not derive from the rightness or wrongness of the feelings of the person who adheres to it, but from the degree to which it satisfies some external criteria (be they utilitarian or whatever), and that therefore one is willing to press on with rational enquiry beyond the point where the “good” guys will start to find it a nuisance (i.e. because it starts to undermine their emotional attachments to their own positions). What do you hear most often from people if you carry on in this way? That you don’t care enough, or that you care about the wrong things – that you care more about being “correct” in some impossible, analytic way that has nothing to do with real human experience than you do about people’s actual needs and commitments. That you are a bad person, emotionally misconfigured, for caring about these “abstract” things when you should be caring about those “concrete” ones. That you are cold, or perverse, or secretly on the other side, or just like making trouble.
Now, I’m a fairly soft rationalist – being in a state of permanent doubt about what the criteria for evaluating an argument should be, even though I think that there must be some and that it matters a great deal what they are – but I become a hard rationalist, veering towards obnoxious self-parody, when I get this kind of treatment. Because of course I do care about people’s actual needs and commitments; I just think that we are apt to misrecognise what those needs really are, and what those commitments really commit us to, and that this misrecognition is to a degree corrigible by suspending what we take to be our immediate interests, our gut feelings about things, and using the tools of rationality to think our positions through. If an argument comes out right, as far as we can tell using the evaluative procedures we have at our disposal, then it has at least a chance of being right; if it comes out wrong then it has to be reconsidered, no matter how right it feels. A rationalist, hard or soft, is committed to changing their own mind about things if they find that their arguments for their position don’t make sense; they are someone who *can*, at least sometimes, be reasoned into reconsidering, because they value and try to develop this capability within themselves. It seems to me that the devaluing of this capability, the counsel of despair that asserts that nobody has it really (or only a very few people do – and they’re impotent, irrelevant freaks), is an attack on something of fundamental human worth, something that makes the life we have worth living and a better life possible. Without it, we might as well just beat each other over the head with clubs -which, after all, is the enemy’s default response in any case.
Tuesday, January 31, 2012 at 12:12 pm
Daniel: I’ll withdraw the claim as I don’t have a ready source and grant that it is just as likely a myth about Singer as something he actually said.
Tuesday, February 21, 2012 at 12:29 am
The difference between rhetoric, reasoned arguments and parrhesia
Rhetoric uses emotive arguments to persuade (nothing to do with honesty I’m afraid – you can be an honest rehtorician or not be it matters little – cf parrhesia)
Reasoned argument assumes the other person is as rational as you (which can be translated to ‘the other person’s subscribes to the same belief in what rationality is’ as you – cf this whole comment)
Parrhesia – you speak your truth and couldn’t give a monkey’s whether the other person agrees with you or not (honest from an ‘objective viewpoint of your ‘being-in-the-world’ whether you are telling a true statement or not – but will get you shot whatever the revolution – to save your skin you will require rhetoric)