I’m working my way through Division One, Chapter Six (Care as the Being of Dasein) of Being and Time right now. The analysis of anxiety and its distinction from fear is as straightforward as Heidegger gets, but I’m not sure I understand how it exactly fits into the argument of the chapter.
More precisely, I understand how it’s supposed to fit: we need some way of grasping Dasein “as a whole,” and anxiety as a “basic state-of-mind” has the special property of revealing Dasein’s being-in-the-world as such. If we didn’t have a direct revelation of the wholeness of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, then the analysis of “care” would be in danger of simply adding up the properties we have previously noted, etc., which would be a violation of Heidegger’s methodological commitments.
Yet the transition between the analysis of anxiety and that of care feels forced to me. It’s as though all anxiety is doing for us here is showing the bare fact that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is a unified phenomenon that Dasein can confront as such — and lo and behold, that phenomenon turns out to be unified under the heading of “care”! I understand what the analysis of anxiety is setting up in terms of Division Two, but “locally” it doesn’t seem to fit as well as the analysis of fear (which similarly worked to set up later analyses) did.
(One possible articulation between the two analyses would be if care was to anxiety as understanding is to state-of-mind — but that doesn’t seem to be what’s going on here.)