A couple weeks ago, I posted this quote from Being and Time, claiming that an Agambenian priority of potentiality came more or less directly from Heidegger: “As a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand, possibility as an existentiale [i.e., the equivalent of a "category" for Dasein's special way of being] is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically” (M&R trans., pg. 183, original pp. 143-44).
Last night I worked through the analysis of death, and it strikes me that what is most crucial about death isn’t that it’s the empirical “end” of Dasein’s life (such that all accounts are settled, etc.) — my death is the potentiality that is, for me, only ever potentiality. Once it becomes “actualized,” I am no longer there. Thus death is uniquely suited to the problem of grasping Dasein as a whole, given that potentiality seems to be the obstacle to doing so. (And the problem with the understanding of death perpetuated by the “they” is that it makes death seem like it’s been actualized, when the really anxiety-provoking thing is that it’s always present precisely as a potentiality.)
The “existentialist” reading of this analysis is misleading — the problem isn’t to find personal authenticity, etc., but to isolate a pure and unsurpassable potentiality that can never be actual, i.e., to get a handle on a formal philosophical concept. Nowhere is the orientation of the existential analysis of Dasein toward the question of Being more radical, even if these pages have tended to rivet readers’ attention on the analysis of Dasein as an end in itself.
[Disclaimer: odds are, I'm not saying anything remotely original. I realize this.]
Thursday, August 9, 2012 at 8:44 am
Adam,
Are you aware of Simon Critchley’s summary of Heidegger’s Being and Time in the Guardian?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/05/heidegger-philosophy
It might be useful for your students, as it is quite accessible.
Thursday, August 9, 2012 at 8:49 am
Yes, it has been recommended several times. I don’t like the fact that he leads off with the Nazi issue.
Thursday, August 9, 2012 at 8:51 am
That is a good point. Though I expect Shimer students are better, my students look for any excuse to shut down and not take a thinker seriously, and that poisons the well rather than constructively confronts an issue when presented to that audience.
Thursday, August 9, 2012 at 9:10 am
Or they could just read Heidegger for themselves and talk it through?
Thursday, August 9, 2012 at 9:18 am
Also: this post isn’t a request for recommendations. Let’s stay on topic.
Thursday, August 9, 2012 at 5:59 pm
“As a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary.”
Is “possibility” from this quote equivalent to your “potentiality”? If it is I would say that death cannot be characterized as potentiality (possibility) because death is always necessary. Of course: it is never actual (for Dasein) but nevertheless is necessary.
I hope you can understand what I wrote – my english is poor.
Regards
Friday, August 10, 2012 at 6:11 am
It is necessary, yes, but no one knows when death will come. It’s possible it could come at any moment — but not necessarily now. The fact that it’s necessary means that it’s always possible as long as we’re alive — we can’t avoid death permanently.
Friday, August 10, 2012 at 7:16 am
I agree with you but I guess it means that we have here two concepts of death – or rather one concept and one infinite set of concepts. The first is a general concept of my death in the future, the second is my death at particular time (today, tomorrow and so on…). The former is always necessary but never possible (according to Heidegger’s definition), the latter is always possible but never necessary.
Friday, August 10, 2012 at 7:26 am
Have you read the relevant section in Being and Time?
Friday, August 10, 2012 at 6:19 pm
A remark and a question:
(1) I’m really appreciating this series of remarks as I completed my own first reading of B&T a few months back and didn’t understand a lot of it but was really riveted by what I was able to follow. So thanks.
(2) Just a quick question about death — what about suicide? Some folks do bring about their own deaths and, so long as they do not surprisingly die before that event is enacted, they die knowing when they are going to die (“now” when I pull the trigger, or whatever else). I realize, from what Adam has written, that this does not “actualize” the “potentiality” of death (since, upon pulling the trigger and dying they are “no longer there”). Still, I’m curious as to what an Heideggerian take on this matter may be, in light of what Adam wrote (and it would help me understand this more… if it’s not taking us too far afield and if anybody is willing to take a shot at it [no pun intended]).
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 5:32 am
No. But I’ve read it now and I see that my comments were pointless. Sorry for that.
Now I have only two little objections. Firstly, this sentence „Once it becomes “actualized,” I am no longer there.” could be a bit misleading. It just means that I cannot experience my own death, I cannot see its actualization because I am no longer here and this seems like an empirical fact. But if that was the argument one could easily say that it does not matter whether I still exist or not, what matters is a fact that death became actual. And he would be right. It is obvious that death can become actual, but here we’re talking about a possiblity as a modal category. Thus I think Heidegger rather claims that one shouldn’t use such a notion as „actual” in connection with his own death because then his death wouldn’t be grasp by him as a potentiality qua existentiale; his death would be for him as a death of any other person. „Actual” here is always a modal category so it cannot be an opposite to possibility as an existentiale.
„The problem isn’t to find personal authenticity, etc., but to isolate a pure and unsurpassable potentiality that can never be actual, i.e., to get a handle on a formal philosophical concept”. Do you really think that getting a handle on a concept could help? And what problem do we really have with the concept? Is it the fact that potentiality can never be actual and so the concept seems paradoxical? Don’t you think that thinking about my own death as something that can be actualized is almost a natural inclination of human beings. If there are two kinds of being-toward-death: everyday and authentic we just should try to be the latter – so it is a problem of practice not of a philosophical concepts.
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 5:49 am
@dan
“Evidently [authentic] being-toward-death, which is now in question, cannot have the character of being out for soemthing and taking care of it with a view toward its actualization. For one thing, death as something possible is not a possible thing at hand or objectively present, but a possibility-of-being of Dasein. Then however, taking care of the actualization of what is thus possible would have to mean bringing about one’s own demise. Thus Dasein would precisely deprive itself of the very ground for an existing being-toward-death.” [261]
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 6:51 am
Dan: The success of suicide is not assured.
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 6:54 am
fb: Heidegger probably does “prefer” the authentic approach to death, though he’s always careful to say that he does not intend to be denigrating toward the everyday. The goal of the analysis of Dasein is not to teach us how to live (though it may also do that), but to find some way to get at the question of the meaning of Being. Thus the analysis of death is important primarily as a way to get ahold of Dasein’s distinctive mode of potentiality or possibility.
And “my” death can never be actualized, because once I’m dead, there’s no “me” anymore.
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 10:08 am
Adam: It depends how hard you try. The results of some efforts are as close to assured as anything ever could be.
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 11:07 am
Well, there’s still some degree of uncertainty, and in any case, I’m still not there to experience the moment of “my” death.
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 4:40 pm
Adam,
R1: “And “my” death can never be actualized, because once I’m dead, there’s no “me” anymore”
R2: “There is no ‘me’ anymore” implies that I’m dead and I can only be dead if my death became actualized. Therefore my death can be actualized.
What’s wrong with R2? Nothing. It’s just shows that I behave here as an everyday Being-toward-death. As an authentic Being-toward-death I could not say such thing.
It’s interesting to see why exactly R2 presuppose an everyday Being-toward-death. “I” in R2 refers to me. Of course it is immposible for anyone to state that “I’m dead” because if I were dead I could not state anything. When one says “I’m dead” it means that after one’s death somebody could truly say that so-and-so person (viz.: me) is dead. Thus in R2 I look at myself as I was just another thing in the world.
But if R2 is conntected with everyday Being-toward-death, so is R1. Why? Because in R1 you also say “I’m dead” and this sentence makes sense only if “I” can be replaced by your name. And that means that you have to look at yourself “from above”.
And that is why I called your R1 misleading in my previous comment.
[probably the tone of this comment shows that I'm absolutely sure about what I wrote. I'm not.]
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 4:52 pm
No, when you’re dead, you’re dead. There’s no “you” to experience “your” death qua “yours.” This is really extremely simple. I’m not interested in trying to explain further — there are a ton of great secondary sources on Heidegger if you don’t understand this point. This post presupposes a basic comprehension of Heidegger’s argument.
Saturday, August 11, 2012 at 8:03 pm
Now it occurs to me that I should have used the first person, but still.
Sunday, August 12, 2012 at 2:01 pm
If I decide to commit suicide at noon tomorrow, if I am existing authentically I still deal with the ever-present possibility of death between now and then. Admittedly I have an idea of when it will probably, or even almost certainly, arrive but in that case I treat death as demise and not the authentic notion of death, which is a continual possibility (of the impossibility) of existence. I may even “cheat” authentic death to a certain point by picking up a gun and living my last few moments with the (almost) certainty of death at 5:20 pm, but this would not condition my experience of possibilities in the way that an authentic relation to death would. So I don’t think it’s a counter-example, just an example of an inauthentic relation to death.